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 The article, “Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation,” by Bear 
and Rand (1), uses game theoretic models to examine the role of intuition and 
deliberation in human cooperation. The premise is that dual processes characterize 
human social decision making: “(i) automatic, intuitive processes that are relatively 
effortless but inflexible; and (ii) controlled, deliberative processes that are relatively 
effortful but flexible” (1). The objective is to “provide a formal theoretical framework 
for considering the question of whether prosociality is intuitive or whether it requires 
self-control,” and the article concludes that “evolution never favors strategies for 
which deliberation increases cooperation” (1). However, the evolutionary model 
suffers from a serious shortcoming; it precludes survival of altruistic individuals—
thought to represent a major share of human populations (2). It is therefore not 
suitable for addressing whether human cooperative behavior is intuitive. 
 Although the model can account for pro-social behavior in one-shot 
interactions, such as one-shot prisoner’s dilemmas, the cooperation observed is rooted 
in self-interest and explained as a “spillover from settings where cooperative behavior 
can be payoff-maximizing.” Such strategic cooperation stands in contrast to 
intrinsically altruistic behavior, which is thought to represent a defining feature of 
human social interaction, across cultures (3). A case in point is the concept of strong 
reciprocity—which combines the altruistic propensity to reward others for 
cooperative, norm-abiding behavior with the predisposition to punish others for norm 
violations or non-cooperative behavior, even when individually costly (3). Altruistic 
behavior often finds its motivational source in pro-social emotions, among which the 
most important are ‘empathy’—“the apprehension or comprehension of another’s 
emotional state”—and ‘empathetic concern’, better known as ‘sympathy’ (4). Another 
source is ‘warm glow’, or impure altruism; the individual is motivated by emotional 
rewards from acting pro-socially (5). For example subjective satisfaction—as well as 
neural activity in areas associated with reward processing, the caudate and the right 
nucleus accumbens—are amplified when individuals voluntarily make transfers to a 
charity (6).  
 The model put forth by Bear and Rand (1), however, preclude altruism in 
equilibrium. Individuals play either a one-shot or a repeated prisoners’ dilemma, and 
costly deliberation allows for revision of strategies, in case initial strategies are 
suboptimal for the particular game at hand. An altruist who plays the repeated 
prisoners dilemma would prefer to cooperate, but so would a self-interested 
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individual. In the one-shot game, however, the altruist would also prefer to cooperate, 
although this strategy is suboptimal in material terms. This puts the altruist at 
disadvantage—those who play the defect strategy, even if only occasionally, would 
do better in reproductive terms, implying extinction of altruistic preferences. Similar 
reasoning implies that a population of altruists would not survive the introduction of 
selfish players.  
 It is evident that the model by Bear and Rand (1) precludes a crucial stylized 
fact about human social decision making: cooperation is not only strategically 
motivated—it is often altruistic. A meaningful model of the evolution of human 
cooperation must produce at least one equilibrium consistent with this fact.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 4 
References 
1. Bear A, Rand D G (2015) Intuition, deliberation and the evolution of 
cooperation. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 113(4): 936–941. 
2. Fehr E, Schmidt K M (2006) The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and 
Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories. In Handbook on the 
Economics of Giving, Recipcrocity and Altruism, ed. Kolm Serge-Christophe, 
Mercier Ythier Jean, 615–91. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
3. Fehr E, Fischbacher U (2003) The Nature of Human Cooperation.  Nature 
425(6960): 785-91.. 
4. Jensen K, Vaish A, Schmidt M F H (2014) The Emergence of Human 
Prosociality: Aligning with Others through Feelings, Concerns, and Norms. 
Frontiers in Psychology 1-16 doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00822. 
5. Andreoni, J (1989) Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and 
Ricardian Equivalence. Journal of Political Economy 97(6): 1447–1458.  
6. Harbaugh W, Mayr U, Burghart D (2007) Neural Responses to Taxation and 
Voluntary Giving Reveal Motives for Charitable Donations. Science 316 
(5831): 1622–1625. 
 
 
